Key Takeaways
- Trump's executive order threatened Paul, Weiss with revoked security clearances and banned government contracts, prompting chair Brad Karp to negotiate a deal .
- The controversial agreement required abandoning DEI initiatives and providing $40M in pro bono work for Trump’s priorities .
- High-profile departures followed, including 10+ litigation partners like Karen Dunn (who started a new firm) and Damian Williams (who joined resisting firm Jenner & Block) .
- Firms that fought Trump in court (e.g., Jenner & Block, Susman Godfrey) won rulings deeming the orders unconstitutional, using Paul, Weiss’s deal as evidence of bad faith .
- Long-term repercussions include reputational damage, recruitment challenges, and a shift toward corporate clients over litigation .
The Existential Threat: Trump’s Executive Order
Imagine getting up for work on a Monday and finding out the President of the United States just signed an order barring your company from all government contracts. That’s what hit Paul, Weiss in March 2025. Trump’s executive order did four big things: revoked security clearances for the firm’s lawyers, blocked them from government buildings, ended federal contracts, and restricted dealings with federal employees .
The stated reasons? Three main gripes. First, they’d hired Mark Pomerantz—a former prosecutor who’d investigated Trump’s hush money payments. Second, partner Jeannie Rhee worked on a civil lawsuit tied to the January 6th Capitol riot. Third, an accusation of “racially discriminatory hiring practices” . Chair Brad Karp called it an “existential crisis.” Without security clearances, their white-collar defense practice would collapse. Government-facing clients might bolt. The firm’s survival looked shaky .
Negotiating Survival: The Terms of the Deal
Karp moved fast. Within six days, he’d struck a deal to get the order lifted. But the terms shocked the legal world. Paul, Weiss agreed to two major conditions: ditch all DEI policies and programs, and provide $40 million in pro bono legal work aligned with Trump’s priorities .
In a firm-wide email, Karp defended the move, saying they’d “follow the law” on employment practices while keeping a “commitment to diversity” . Critics saw it as a surrender. Worse, it set a template. Eight other firms (like Kirkland & Ellis and Latham & Watkins) later made similar deals, totaling nearly $1 billion in pledged pro bono work . Paul, Weiss got off lighter—$40M versus higher sums from others—but being first made them the face of the controversy .
Exodus: High-Profile Departures and New Alliances
Almost immediately, partners started leaving. The biggest blow came when Karen Dunn—co-chair of litigation and a top Democratic strategist (she prepped Kamala Harris for debates)—announced she was leaving. With her went Jeannie Rhee (ex-Mueller prosecutor), Bill Isaacson (antitrust heavyweight), and others. Together, they launched Dunn Isaacson Rhee, taking tech clients like Meta and Google with them .
Table: Key Departures from Paul, Weiss
Then came Damian Williams. He’d only rejoined Paul, Weiss in January 2025 after serving as Manhattan’s top federal prosecutor. By June, he’d jumped to Jenner & Block—a firm that fought Trump’s order and won in court. His statement praised Jenner’s willingness to tackle “hard fights” . Even Jeh Johnson, Obama’s DHS secretary, retired early .
Contrasting Paths: Firms That Fought Back
While Paul, Weiss negotiated, four firms dug in and sued: Jenner & Block, Perkins Coie, WilmerHale, and Susman Godfrey. Their argument? Trump’s orders were unconstitutional retaliation against their work .
And they won. Repeatedly. Federal judges issued temporary restraining orders blocking the EOs. Then, on May 25, Judge Beryl Howell permanently voided the order against Perkins Coie. Her ruling pointed to Paul, Weiss’s deal as proof Trump’s motives weren’t about national security. If Paul, Weiss could fix their “risk” in six days by cutting a deal, the threat was never real .
“The speed of the reversal [...] further support the conclusion that national security considerations are not a plausible explanation.” — Judge Beryl Howell
At a hearing for Susman Godfrey’s case, their lawyer Donald Verrilli (ex-U.S. Solicitor General) hammered this point: Paul, Weiss’s quick rescue showed the orders were “leverage for negotiation,” not legitimate security measures .
Internal Fractures and the Silent Majority
Inside Paul, Weiss, tensions flared. Before the deal, partners like Kannon Shanmugam (Supreme Court practice chair) had prepared a lawsuit to block Trump’s order. Litigators like Dunn were on the management committee debating strategy .
Karp put the deal to a partnership vote. Of 200+ partners, the “vast majority” backed him, seeing it as pragmatic survival . But many litigators felt betrayed. The firm had historic ties to Democratic causes—like defending the Scottsboro Boys in the 1930s—and its identity felt compromised .
Privately, compensation shifts added strain. Under Karp, Paul, Weiss moved to “black box” pay (partners don’t know peers’ earnings) and added non-equity “income partners.” Some departees were in this second tier, feeling marginalized even before the Trump deal .
Long-Term Fallout: Reputation and Recruitment
The reputational hit is tangible. Recruiter Bryson Malcolm noted: “Paul, Weiss used to be the gold standard for litigation. I think that reputation is waning” . Law students track these events closely. One recruiter warned:
“Students are plugged in [...] I don’t see a situation where a student would choose Paul, Weiss over peers that didn’t have similar fallout. It’s just very clear Paul, Weiss is not a safe option.”
Financially, the corporate side may cushion the blow. Under Karp, Paul, Weiss aggressively built its private equity practice, landing giants like Apollo Global and Blackstone. Corporate lawyers now outnumber litigators . As recruiter Alisa Levin put it: “Nobody has left yet from the corporate side and I doubt anybody will” . But the brain drain in litigation risks hollowing out a pillar of the firm’s legacy.
Political and Legal Repercussions
Democrats are probing the deals. Sixteen House Democrats sent letters to Paul, Weiss and eight other firms, suggesting their agreements might violate bribery laws. Karp fired back: “We reject any suggestion that any element of the agreement is contrary to law” .
Meanwhile, the firms that resisted are leveraging their wins. Jenner & Block’s landing of Damian Williams—a star prosecutor—right after their court victory signals how the fight burnished their credibility .
But risks linger. Even with court wins, agencies might quietly steer contracts away from “disfavored” firms. Clients needing government approvals (e.g., mergers) could prefer “safer” firms like Paul, Weiss over a Susman Godfrey .
Looking Ahead: A Firm Transformed?
Paul, Weiss’s path reflects a years-long shift. Once a litigation powerhouse, it’s now dominated by corporate work for private equity. The Trump deal accelerated that transition—losing Democratic-leaning litigators while corporate partners stayed put .
Karp insists the litigation group remains strong, telling partners that six of the firm’s ten largest ongoing matters are litigations untouched by departures . But the exodus of stars like Dunn and Williams—and their client relationships—leaves questions.
For Big Law broadly, Paul, Weiss’s choice created a roadmap. Was it capitulation? Realpolitik? Either way, it reshaped the industry’s standoff with power—and redefined what it costs to survive.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did Trump target Paul, Weiss specifically?
The order cited three reasons: hiring ex-prosecutor Mark Pomerantz (who investigated Trump), Jeannie Rhee’s work on a January 6th-related lawsuit, and allegations of discriminatory hiring .
How much pro bono work did Paul, Weiss agree to provide?
$40 million in services supporting Trump’s initiatives. Eight other firms later made similar deals, totaling nearly $1 billion .
Did any Paul, Weiss partners support the deal?
Yes. Karp put it to a partnership vote, and the “vast majority” of over 200 partners backed it initially .
Have other firms faced consequences for resisting Trump’s orders?
No. Four firms (Jenner & Block, Perkins Coie, WilmerHale, Susman Godfrey) sued and won court rulings blocking the orders as unconstitutional .
Is Paul, Weiss still facing backlash?
Yes. House Democrats are investigating if the deals constitute bribery, and recruiters note lasting reputational damage in legal circles .
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